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GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY AND MASSIMO DI MATTEO
2.3 . Trade, Migration, and Environment : A General
Equilibrium Analysis
1. Introduction
Z
Two major trends in the world economy are international migration and envi-
	l degradation. The object of the paper is to analyze the connection
"een these two trends, which have generally been analyzed in isolation .
Here we represent a world economy in which the exploitation of natural
resources as well as the migration of labor have a global character. We dis-
cuss the welfare impact of migration and exploitation of natural resources
and policies to address these issues .
Industrial development has reached a point where it adversely affects the
natural environment . A large share of the world population could be harmed
by the instability of the global climate caused by increased concentration
of C02 in the atmosphere . The destruction of biodiversity on the planet has
reached unprecedented proportions. Although these are world phenomena,
Chichilnisky (1994) showed that environmental degradation can also be con-
sidered as a North-South issue . The international market is the vehicle through
which the overproduction ofnatural resources by the South is reconciled with
the overconsumption by the North. At the heart of this explanation there is
the crucial role played by the different regimes of property rights prevailing
in the resource extraction ofthe two regions.
Another world-wide phenomenon, the migration of labor, has recently
intensified . Large migrant flows from Latin America to the USA and from
North Africa andMiddle East to Europe take place today. The collapse ofthe
socialist economies in Eastern Europe has led to massive migration into the
industrialized part ofEurope.
Not surprisingly, governments and international organizations are con-
cerned with these developments . Migrant labor has profound consequences
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not only on the host countries but also on the countries of origin . Besides
social and political effects, the change in the availability of labor affects the
employmentstructure and the distribution ofincome ofthe countries involved .
Environmental damage can lead to disruptions of entire populations such as
those caused by scarcity ofwater.
Migration is typically linked to wage and income differentials . Moreover,
there is now evidence (e.g . Myers, 1993) that migration is particularly sensi-
tive to the degradation ofthe environment and to the effects ofclimate change .
Migrant flows are typically from the South to the North, since climate changes
affect more the primary sector ofthe economy which is the basis of Southern
economy. In addition developing countries have fewest (technical as well as
economic) resources to confront the problem. It is also believed that environ-
mental refugees, as they could aptly be called (Myers, 1993), are the result
of tropical deforestation, soil erosion and desertification that occur in many
areas ofthe South. Chichilnisky (1994) showed how all these phenomena are
directly connected to trade and to the poor definition of property rights in the
South.
Migration patterns reallocate production intheNorthandSouth economies,
induce a change in trade patterns, and a modification ofrelative prices .
We develop a framework which follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1994), pos-
sessing the same logical structure as the Heckscher-0hlin model that high-
lights the connection between labor migration and exploitation of natural
resources . From our analysis we obtain answers to the following questions :
1 . how does migration affect the exploitation ofnatural resources?
2. howdo policies to check environmental degradation interact with migra-
tion flows?
3. howdo trade policies affect migrationflows andthe exploitation ofnatural
resources?
The main results of the paper are as follows . Migration is prompted by
wage differentials as technology is different across countries . We show that
migration from the South induces a decrease in the exploitation ofthe resource
in the South. This increases thewelfare ofthe South but candecrease that ofthe
North. Migration can lead to higherprices ofresources in the Northand in the
South, setting up aprocess ofinducedtechnical change in the North and better
terms of trade for the South, altogether a positive outcome. As is intuitively
obvious, migration reduces the wage differential between North and South in
amodelwhere, contrary to Heckscher-Ohlinassumptions, technologies differ
between countries. Finally, we show that it is possible that a tax on the use
of the resource in the South induces an increase in its extraction rather than a
decrease . Trade policies could have a positive impact on resource extraction,
could reduce the wage gap and therefore decrease the economic incentive to
the mobility of labour.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 extends it to cover the case ofmigration andproves the main results
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on the effects ofmigration on the exploitation ofthe resource andthe welfare
ofthe South. Section 4examines the tendency towards real wage equalization .
Section 5 argues that tax policies on the use ofthe resource are unreliable in
that they can have effects opposite from what is intended . Finally, we discuss
how traditional trade policies could affect the degree of factor mobility and
the exploitation of resources .
There are two regions, the industrialized countries (North) and the developing
countries (South), two goods A and B and two factors. The formulation
follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1994). The inputs are an environmental resource
E and labor L, that are used to produce the two goods. In both regions the
B good is more resource intensive than A. Constant returns to scale and
fixed coefficients are assumed in the production ofeach good . Technology is
different in the two countries:' there are four technical coefficients, ci (ai),
representing the quantity oflabor (environmental resource) per unit of output
ofgood i. Endowments of labor and environmental resource are not fixed but
depend on relative rewards. Therefore, even if there are fixed coefficients in
.production, there is substitutability amongfactors in the economy as awhole
as relative prices change .2
Consider first the economy of the South. Perfect competition in the goods
market and constant returns to scale imply zero profits in equilibrium so that :
where PA (respectively PB) is the price of good A (B), PE(w) is the price
ofthe environmental resource (labor), ai(q) (i = 1, 2) are the coefficients of
the environmental resource (labor) respectively in industry 1 (B) and 2 (A).
The assumption that B is more intensive in the use ofthe resource than A
translates into a positive value for D = a1 C2 - a2C1 . For future reference we
derive the relation between PB andthe wage, w, andPB and PE, the price of
the resource.
From Equations (1) and (2) we obtain :
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the price ofthe resource and that
the precise form ofthe supply curve
depends
on the prevailing structure of property
rights . We will assume that the
South
has common property (in particular
open access) regimes for the pools
from
whichthe resource is extracted .
To solve the modelwe need to know
the relative price ofthe resource with
respect to labor. However, there is no
developed labor market in the extraction
sector ofthe South that we label the
subsistence sector ofthe economy: hence
there is no market wage . We need to
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South, then the supply curve would have been steeper, as in this case q1PE
equals the private property marginal product which is lower than the CMP.4
This argument leads us to postulate a supply function of the resource
(which is assumed to be linear for simplicity) :
ES = aPE lq + Eo,
	
(4)
where Eo anda > 0.
The parameter a is large when there is common property for the resource
(as it is the case with the South) since it reflects the greater sensitivity of
the supply ofE to its price in comparison to the case where property rights
are well defined.s In the model a large value for a formalizes the so-called
"tragedy of the commons" which is known to lead to an exploitation ofthe
resource which is larger than the oneoccurringwith a private property regime .
The situation is summarized in the following diagram, where ECS is the
common property supply curve and Ep the private property supply curve:
Diagram 1
The demand equations for the resources, ED and LD, are:
E
where Bs (AS) is the supply ofthe B (A) commodity respectively.
In equilibrium demand for resources equals supply so that :
(5)
(6)
The South exports the resource intensive good, B and imports A. Indeed
it has been shown (Chichilnisky, 1994) that when the two countries have
identical technology and preferences, a sufficient reason for them to engage
in trade is the difference in the property rights regime of the natural resource
that is used as an input ofproduction . In particular the South has an apparent
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comparative advantage in, and exports, the resource intensive good . The
South exports good B, even ifNorth and South share similar technology and
preferences.
In the context ofthe present, more general model, where technologies and
preferences may differ among countries, the assumed pattern of trade can
always be sustained by a suitable choice ofthe value of the demand for the
A good in the two countries, as it is apparent from inspection of diagram 2
below.
Exports of the South equal the difference between domestic supply and
demand, namely :
XB -s _Bs-B ,
whereas imports of commodity A equal the difference between demand and
domestic supply, namely :
2.2 . Two Region Model
Equations for the North are similar except for different values of the parame-
ters and ofthe exogenous variables, reflecting different technologies, prefer-
ences and property right regime . In the North it is possible that labor supply
responds little to the real wage.b Property rights for the resources are well
defined in the North so that the supply curve for the North is steeper reflecting
the private property marginal product.
In Equation (4)we approximate q, the opportunity cost oflabor, by PB for
the South where subsistence labor is employed in the extraction sector. For
the North we approximate q by PA as there is no subsistence sector in the
North. Equation (4) now reads for the South:
Es =aPEIPB+Eo
and for the North:
Es(N) = aNPEIPA + Eo(N) .
The North imports the resource intensive good B and exports the (skilled)
labor intensive good A.
There are otherselfexplanatory conditions to be fulfilled in an international
equilibrium:
PA(S) = PA (N),
	
(12)
PB(S) = PB(N), (13)
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To close the model we follow the original Chichilnisky's model (1981)8
but we could equally consider other assumptionswhichwould lead to similar
results:9
AD(S) = AD(S),(S),
AD(N) = Ao (N) .
The model is composed of 12 equations for the South ((1-11) and (17))
plus 12 analogous equations for the North (denoted (1'-11 ') and (18)) plus
(12), (13), (15) and (16) . Indeed, Equation (14) is always satisfied when trade
is balanced and (12), (13), and (14) hold . There are 28 endogenous variables,
14 in each region : PB, PA, w, PE, LS, LD, ES, ED, BS, BD, AS, AD, XB,XDD .1o
It turns out that the model can be solved analytically in a very simple way:
it reduces to a quadratic equation in the Southern terms of trade, PB . Starting
from the equilibrium condition in the world market for the A good
Ao (S) + Ao (N) = AS(S) +AS(N)
andusing Equations (1-8) we obtain :
[A(N)] PB + [Ao(S) +Ao(N) + C(S) + C(N)] PB
- [V(S) +V(N)] = 0,
	
(19)
A(N) = aN(C1C2)N1DN,
C(S) = (1/D)[c1Eo - a1Lo + (aj a20 + clc2a)/D],
C(N) = ( 1 /D)N[(CIEO - a1Lo)N + (ala20 - Cia)N/DN],
V(S) = ,3ai/D2 + aci/D2,
V(N) = 3N(a'1)N1DN .
Equation (19) has one positive solution since the constant term is negative
andthe quadratic is positive .
Once the terms oftrade are known all the other endogenous variables can
be computed (Chichilnisky, 1981). The solution of the model is, therefore,
complete .
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XB (S) = XD (N), (14)
XA (S) = XA(N) . (15)
Finally, we choose the numeraire :
PA =1 . (16)
The market for the A good can be illustrated in the following diagram,
wherethe continuous line indicates the equilibrium level ofthe terms of trade
at which the Southern demand for exports equals the Northern supply of
exports:
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Diagram 2
2 .3 . The Opportunity Cost ofLabor in the Subsistence Sector
Typically, the opportunity cost oflabor, q is equal to the wage but in the South
there is no formal labor market in the subsistence sector. Therefore, in the
following we will derive an endogenous value for q in a general equilibrium
fashion, following (Chichilnisky, 1994).
We assume that the typical worker maximizes a utility function U =
U(A, No - N) depending on the consumption of good A and on leisure,
No - N, subject to the following constraint : PAA = PEE(N), where E has
already been defined in Section 2.1, and No is the total available amount of
time . In the preferred situation it is true for the typical worker that :
8U/8(No - N)
	
PE(8E/8N)
all/8A PA
aU/8(No - N)
Previously we have shown (in Section 2.1) that qmust be equal to the value
of the common property marginal product; since in our North-South model
PA = 1, it follows that :
So q, which is a function ofPE/PA, is the ratio ofthe marginal utilities of
the typical worker. This fully defines an endogenous value for q, once PB is
known. From the latter we can compute PE using Equations (1) and (2).
The next step is to show that as the price of the resource which the typ-
ical worker sells goes down, (s)he has to work more and not less to secure
a minimum level of.subsistence when the price of consumption goods has
increased (in relative terms) . Hence our next step is to ascertain what happens
to the worker's choice ofleisure andgood A when (s)he is confronted with a
different price ofthe resource and we allow the opportunity cost q to change .
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For this purpose only, we assume that the utility function U has an elasticity
ofsubstitution between leisure and A less than one. i 1 In this case an increase
in the relative price ofAimplies a reduction in the leisure consumed or, which
is the same thing, an increase in the supply of effort . Hencewe establish :
PROPOSITION 1 . If the elasticity ofsubstitution between leisure and con-
sumption is less than one, a worker in the subsistence sector who maximizes
U = U(A, No - N) subject to PAA = PEE(N), increases his (her) effort
when theprice ofresource E decreases vis-d-vis theprice ofgoodA.
Proof. The supply curve ES we derived (Equation (4)) wasparameterized
by q. As PEIPA decreases, the quantity of effort increases and with it the
supply of the resource . By the strict concavity of the production function,
also (8E/aN) decreases so that q has to decrease as well . In terms of our
supply curve for the resource this means that such a curve shifts downwards
signalling in equilibrium a higher supply ofthe resource as PE IPA decreases,
once changes in q are taken into account.
	
0
Ageometrical explanation of the result is provided in the Appendix.
3. Why Does Labor Migrate?
Since technologies are different across countries factor prices are not equal-
ized after trade, as the Heckscher-0hlin theory (which isbased on the assump-
tion ofequal technologies) asserts. 12 Indeed real wages are equal across coun-
tries only when the terms of trade take on a particular value, PB, given by
the following expression :
(ai/D)N -ai/D =_ P .M
(a2ID)N-a2/D
(20)
The value in this expression depends exclusively on technological parame-
ters so that only by a coincidence does it equal the equilibrium terms oftrade
that reflects the solution of the general equilibrium model. In addition the
value of the terms of trade given by (20) could be such as to entail a negative
value for the equalized real wage .
A similar argument applies for the price ofthe resource, which in general
is not equalized either. We can show that to have an equalized price for the
resource E, the terms of trade should take on a value, PB, given by the
following expression :
(c1ID)N - c1/D - F=PB . (21)
(c21D)N - c2/D
While in equilibrium either (20) or (21) could occur by coincidence, both
cannot occur at the same time, as it is clear by comparing them: hence
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simultaneous equalization of real wages and resource price across countries
is ruled out.
Ifreal wages are different across countries there is an incentive for workers
to move from the lowwage to the high wage region.13 We can easily establish
underwhich conditions labor moves to the North (South). As every endoge-
nous variable can be computed when the terms of trade are determined, we
know that w/PB < (>)(WIPB)N implies :
[
L2 )N - a2
	
PB < N a, ) al
(D D)] (f , - -D*
Let us make the following by now standard14
ASSUMPTION l . In the South technologies are dual.
By dual technologies in the South we mean that theB sector is much more
resource intensive than in the North. This canbe translated into the model by
assuming a much larger valueforD with respect to DN (see the definition of
D in Section 2.1). Ifthen D » DN then we can establish that labor leaves
the South whenever
PB < (al/D)N - (al/D) PM .
(a2/D)N - (d2/D)
B
In a similar way we can establish (under the same conditions) that the price
ofthe resource is lower in the South than in the North whenever
PB > (cl/D)N - (cl/D) -_ PF.
(c2/D)N - (c1/D)
B
In addition to the real wage gap, other factors have recently been highlighted
in the migration phenomenon . In particular there is evidence (Myers, 1993)
that among the consequences ofenvironmental damage is the fact that people
move away from their homes. It is also believed that environmental refugees
are due to tropical deforestation, soil erosion and desertification .
It is because migration is such a complex phenomenon that at first we do
not intend to establish a strict, quantitative relation between the number of
workers whomigrate andthe real wages gap in the two countries. Though we
maintainthat, amongeconomic factors, realwages differential is a major force
in shaping labor migration, at this stage our analysis can accommodate the
case where (at least part of) migration occurs for environmental motivations .
In order to accommodate the analysis of migration in our framework we
simply reinterpret the equilibrium described in the model ofthe previous sec-
tion as an equilibrium occurring in an interval oftime within whichmigration
is not allowed. 15 At the endof each period workers check whether real wages
are higher in the North than in the South and decide to move towards the
higher wage country.
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Thenumber ofworkerswho at thejunctionbetween oneperiod andanother
leave any one country can be represented in the model as a change in Lo . If
workers leave the South (North) it will be a fall (increase) in Lo for the South
andan increase (fall) ofLo (N) in the North ofexactly the same amount . Then
a new equilibrium is reached within the second period at the endofwhich the
story repeats itself.
4. The Effects ofMigration on Wage Differential and Resource
Extraction
Let us now suppose, quite reasonably, that real wages are lower in the South
than in the North so that workers move from the South to the North. In our
model this is captured by an increase in Lo (N) and a fall in Lo ofexactly the
same magnitude.
We can now establish the following
PROPOSITION 2. IfAssumption 1 holds, migration from the South to the
North is associated with a higher level ofthe South's terms oftrade.
Proof. Using Equation (24) andthe implicit function theorem we compute:
19PB __
	
[al/D] PB
Ho 2PB [A(N)] + [AD(S) + AD (N) + C(S) + C(N)] '
__ [(alID)N] PB (I'M
8Lo(N) 2PB [A(N)] + [AD(S)(S) +A'(N) + C(S) + C(N)]
8PB
In the denominator when a is large in the South the sign of the term in a
determines the sign ofC(S) and C(N). Since the term in a in C(S) is cl c2a,
a positive quantity, the denominator is positive in this case. If Assumption 1
holds, then the numerator of the second expression is larger in absolute value
than the numerator of the first and the net effect will be dominated by the
Northern component. As a consequence of the assumed changes in Lo, the
change in the terms oftrade will be positive . o
The intuitive economic explanation of the above result is as follows. An
increase in Lo (N) and a fall in Lo (S) means that for any level ofthe terms of
trade the supply of labor is larger in the North andsmaller in the South. This
triggers a shift in the production mix in each country, the North increasing
the production of A (at the expense of B), the South the production of the
resource intensive good B (at the expense of A). Take the market for the A
good: ifthe fall in production in the South is smaller than the increase in the
North, then the terms of trade ofthe South increase. This happens precisely
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when, according to our terminology, technologies are dual in the South (using
Equations (5-8)) :
8AS(S) - al <
C
all
	
- 8AS(N)
8LS(S) D D N W(N)
Thesituation is illustrated in the diagram below where PB is the newlevel
of the terms oftrade and A's is the level of supply of A after migration .
Diagram 3
To proceed with our analysis we need to determine whether the wage dif-
ferential decreases after migration. When workers leave the South the terms
of trade are lower than the level at which real wages are equalized . Since as
a consequence of migration flows, the terms of trade increase, it is clear that
the gap,in the terms oftrade will be lower:
PROPOSITION3. AnnAssumption 1 holds, migration will reduce the wage
differential.
Proof. When Assumption 1 holds, workers leave the South whenever
PB < PB. As a consequence of migration from the South terms of trade
increase . Ergo the gap in the terms oftrade reduces . On the other hand, from
the comparison of Equations (1) and (2) with the corresponding Northern
equations, an increase in the terms oftrade will induce a fall in the Southern
real wage which is less than the fall in the Northern, if Assumption 1 holds.
Therefore, there is a tendency towards wage rates equalization . A similar
argument holds when real wages are higher in the South than in the North,
namely when PB > PB. o
The situation16 is illustrated in diagram 4 where the different slopes of the
two curves depends on Assumption 1, namely on the large value ofD with
respect to DN:
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Diagram4
The next point is to explore the impact ofmigration on the resources . We
wish to determine whether differences in PE across countries increase.
The outcome depends on the sign of the differential gap before migration
has taken place. We have established that after migration from the South, the
terms oftrade rise . This in turn will increase PE as is clear from Equations (1)
and (2). In particular the price ofthe resourcewill increase more in the North
than in the South, if Assumption 1 holds, thus increasing the difference in
prices between the North and the South. Only if before migration the price
of the resource were lower in the North than in the South, would migration
result in reducing the differential in the resource price. In other words, if the
equilibrium terms of trade are such that at the same time PB < PB and
PB < PB, then labor migration will induce a reduction in both the labor and
the resource prices gaps .17
From the policy point of view the effects of a yawning gap between the
price ofthe resource across regions could be to foster more direct investment
from the North to exploit the lower level of the resource price in the South;
secondly it could set up aprocess of induced technical progress in the North.
These developments are not dealt with here and deserve further analysis .
The final point in this section is to examine the effects ofmigration on the
exploitation ofresources . What will be the general equilibrium effects ofthe
migration pattern?
When migration takes place from South to North a new equilibrium is
established with a higher level ofthe terms oftrade. In turn this implies anew
level for the price ofthe resource and a newvalue for the opportunity cost of
labor employed inthe subsistence sector to extract the resource. As a result the
quantity supplied ofthe resource will change. In which direction it changes
canbe inferred by making use of a result already established (Proposition 1) .
It was shown there that as the price of the resource increases, the typical
worker in the subsistence sector will supply less effort and therefore less
of the resource will be extracted. Since after migration the terms of trade
increase and, as is clear from Equations (1) and (2), the price of the resource
increases as well, it follows:
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PROPOSITION 4. After migrationfrom the South to the North, ifAssump-
tion 1 holds, the new equilibrium is characterized by a higher level ofthe
resource price and a yawning gap in resourcesprices in the North and the
South, potentially leading to induced technical change in the North. Ifthe
elasticity of substitution between leisure and the consumption good is less
than onefor the subsistence worker, this leads to a higher opportunity cost
ofsubsistence labor in the South. At this new equilibrium the worker applies
less effort and less resource is extracted in the South.
Proof. This is a corollary of Propositions 1 and 2. From Proposition 2
migration from the South will increase the terms oftrade. From Equations (1)
and (2) the increase in the terms oftrade will increase the price ofthe resource
(relative to PA). This, via Proposition 1, induces an increase in leisure and,
therefore, a fall in effort ofthe typical worker and a decrease in the exploitation
of the resource.
	
p
5. The Effects of Migration on Welfare
We finally consider the effects on the welfare ofthe two countries . Since the
quantity consumed of the A good is given in each country, one has to look at
the response of the demand for the B good (when terms of trade change) to
analyze welfare improvements . Indeed if, following migration, the demand
for basic goods increases in the South, then South's welfare increases . To
show this, first we recall that exports are the difference between domestic
supply and demand. Secondly, we notice that the supply of B depends pos-
itively on its price, PB. If we can show that exports fall when the terms of
trade increase, then it is clear that demand has to increase .
PROPOSITION 5. Migration oflaborfrom the South to the North increases
the South's welfare, ifAssumption 1 holds.
Proof. From
Xs Bs - BDB=
using (5) and (6) and Walras' Law, we get
This reduces to
XB = (c2E - a2L)/D - (PEE + wL -Ao)IPB.
XB = acIC2/D2PB - aci/D2PB + Ps
1
x [Eocl/D - Loaf/D +AD -,Qai/D2PB + 0ala2/D2].
If we differentiate with respect to PB we get
aXB/aPB = (a/D2PB)[-clc2 + 2c1PB I] - PB2
x [AD + Eocl/D - Loal/D + Qala2/D2 -,3a2/D2PB].
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The sign of the expression is dominated by the terms in a which is very
large for the South. From Equations (1) and (2) it is immediate to see that the
sign ofthe term in square brackets is negative if c2/D < 2PE/PB. The latter
is satisfied when Assumption 1 holds, namely D is very large. On the other
hand,
8BS/8PB = [aclc2/D2 +,Qala2/D2]PB2 > 0.
Therefore, when the terms oftrade increase, supply ofB goods increases and
exports decrease : hence demand for B, being the difference of the two, has
to increase and the welfare of the South increases as well .
Without more information it is impossible to determinethe sign ofthe demand
for basics in the North, as there a is not large. We conclude that as workers
move from the South to the North, South's welfare increases and North's
can either decrease or increase, if we measure welfare by the amount of
consumption goods available in each economy.
To end this section we stress that dual technology in the South is a crucial
assumption for some of our results. If the hypothesis were true for the North
(an unlikely event, though) migration from the South would bring about a
decrease in the terms of trade rather than an increase. Consequently, when
labor leaves the South resource extraction would expand rather than contract.
However, the conclusions about the tendency towards a reduction ofthe wage
(and resource price) gap would be unaffected .
6. Effects ofTax andTrade Policies
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In this section we examine the effects of a tax policy in the South aimed at
reducing the exploitation ofthe resource and ofachange in the property rights
in the South. We will also consider the effects oftrade policy in the South.
It is generally believed that taxes on the use of the resource will lead to
a reduction in demand and therefore will help environmental preservation .
However typically this kind of analysis assumes that all other prices remain
constant . Here we would like to examine the effect ofa tax on the use ofthe
resource in the general equilibrium model we have just presented.
Let us assume that a unit tax T on the use of the resource (paid by those
who utilize it) is levied in the South. Assume also that the revenue from this
tax is used to increase the domestic demand for the non-resource intensive
good, A. In this case we establish:
PROPOSITION 6 . A unit tax T on the use ofthe resource, whoseproceeds
are used to increase demandfor the A commodity, will reduce the terms of
trade, theprice ofthe resource, andincrease the output ofthe resource in the
South.
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Proof. Levying a unit tax on the use of the resource and allocating the
revenue to the demand for good A is tantamount to assuming a shift of
demand in favor ofgood A. By using the implicit function theorem and (24),
let us compute:
The above expression is negative since the denominator is positive as in
(25) . The decrease in the terms oftrade induces a lower level ofthe resource
price, via Equations (1) and (2), an increase in the output ofthe resource and
a fall in the opportunity cost ofsubsistence labor via Proposition 1 .
	
o
We have shown that partial equilibrium result could be misleading since after
the tax the price of the resource actually falls rather than increases and this
leads to more extraction, not less . If the above policy were enacted when real
wages were lower in the South, one further effect of this policy would be
that of encouraging migration from the South as it widens the wage gap and
induces more degradation.
Can one resort to some other policy to reduce the exploitation of the
resource? An alternative policy in the South would be to define property
rights in a better way so that the extraction of the resource is less sensitive
to its price andthe tendency to an overexploitation ofthe resource is kept in
check (see Chichilnisky, 1994).
Finally, we discuss the effects oftradepolicy, in reference to results derived
in a context of a similar model. Di Matteo (1993) proved that an export
duty in the South increases its terms of trade. 18 Therefore, a move towards
protectionism by increasing the terms of trade and the price of the resource
will reduce the amount ofresource produced and exported in the South.
In addition, Di Matteo (1993) proved that a tax on the production of the
B good in the South increases its terms of trade and therefore, as a result,
exploitation ofthe resource falls .
As a result of these policy actions, the real wage differential is reduced
and, other things equal, we also expect migration to reduce .
7. Conclusions
aPB _ -PB
aAD (S) 2PB [A(N)] -f. Ao (S) + Ao (N) + C(S) + C(N)
We have analyzed the relations between degradation ofthe environment and
labor migration, two phenomenawhich are at the centre oftoday's economic
debate . In the South, contrary to the North, property rights in the extraction
sector are not well defined. The South exports the resource intensive good.
Migration occurs due to wage differentials . Underour conditions migration
leads to better terns oftrade for the South, the price of the resource goes up
and less resource is extracted in the South: the welfare in the South increases .
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Under our hypotheses migration from the South to the North helps reducing
the extraction ofthe natural resources.
We also analyze the effect of a unit tax on the resource in the South with
the revenue spent by the government in buying the less resource intensive
good . This reduces the terms oftrade and therefore increases the extraction
of the resource . Our conclusion is that partial equilibrium analysis of taxes
can be misleading in that the overall effects of the imposition of a tax are
opposite from what is intended.
Finally, we notice that a less liberal trade policy has positive effects on the
level of actual exploitation of the resource .
8. Appendix
To show that as the price ofthe resource falls relative to PA the typical worker
will supply more effort as we claimed at the endof Section 2, we first examine
the implication of such achange in the case ofa utility function with a unitary
elasticity of substitution . There are two goods, A and leisure, No - N. The
definition of unitary elasticity ofsubstitution is :
namely
9(A/No - N) PAlq
a(PA1q) Al (No - N) -
1 .
(OA - OC)IOB (OD - OG)IOF
OAIOB ODIOF '
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In words the ratio between the proportionate rate ofchange of the demand
ratio andthe proportionate rate ofchange of the marginal rate of substitution
(which in an ideal situation coincides with the price ratio) is equal to one.
AD
Diagram 5
-N
In the diagram we postulate an increase in PA, i.e. a move from D to G:
we know (using Thales's theorem) that in this case :
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However, the left-hand side of (28) is the proportionate rate of change of
the demand ratio and the right-hand side is the proportionate rate of change
of the price ratio, when the elasticity of substitution is equal to one. In this
situation the worker will consume the same amount of leisure and a smaller
amount oftheA good but in such a waythat the proportion in value terms of
the goods is unaltered after the increase in the price of A.
If, on the contrary, the elasticity is less than 1 then for the left-hand side to
be less than the right-hand side, it is necessary that the amount of A chosen,
say OZ, is greater than the amount chosen in the case of unitary elasticity,
i.e . OC. This means that at the newtangency point the amount ofleisure will
be to the left of OB, sayOV: this entails a higher level of A consumed and a
smaller level ofleisure than in the case ofunitary elasticity. Therefore, more
resources are extraced .
Notes
1 .
	
Herewedeal with the interdependence betweenmigration andenvironmental degradation,
whereas in (Chichilnisky, 1994) the focus was on how differences solely in the property
rights regime in the extraction of the resource could lead to an overexploitation of the
resource in the South.
2. Capital is not explicitly included among the factors of producton. However, one can
consider that labour is skilled and embodies acertain degree oftraining and use ofcapital .
Such training could have been acquired by working with machines .
3. The reader is referred to (Chichilnisky, 1994, appendix A) for a detailed proof.
4. The latter equals the average product when the number of workers is very large, as it is
sensible to assume in the South. In this case it is immediate to notice that for a strictly
concave production faction the average product is greater than the marginal . For a more
general argument, see (Chichilnisky, 1994, appendix A) .
5. See (Chichilnisky, 1994, section 3).
6. Avery low value for,3 does not affect results .
7. Following (Chichilnisky, 1994, appendix B).
8. They imply a given structure ofthe indifference curves as shown in (Chichilnisky, 1986,
appendix f) .
9. The assumption about demand is not in contrast with the hypothesis (as expressed at the
end ofthis section) about the behaviour ofthe subsistence workers in the South, as the
latter are not part ofthe rest ofthe market economy.
10 . The last two for the North are XB andXA .
11 . In the case of a developing country the assumption can be justified on the following
grounds. Suppose on the contrary, and take an extreme case, that the good A and leisure
were perfect substitutes. The worker would be indifferent between consuming no A and
enjoying leisure only: in a situation where the typical worker has only labour to sell this
implication is totally unrealistic. On the other hand, to suppose that A and leisure were
perfect complements would go too far, as it implies that, no matter what prices are, the
typical worker will consume a given;proportion betweenAand leisure (in physical terms) .
The case weare considering takes into account the fact that as the price ofthe resource the
typical worker sells go down, (s)he has to work more and not less to secure a minimum
level ofsubsistence whose price has gone up (in relative terms) .
12 . We have analyzed the effects of labour and capital migration and its relation with H-0
model in (Chichilnisky and Di Matteo, 1992).
13 . Probably migration flows re
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iigration and its relation with H-0
13 . Probably migration flows respond to differences in real income per capita rather real
wages. We maintain however the classical assumption used in trade theory as the other
would greatly complicate the analysis .
14 . See, e.g . the recent analysis by Barba Navaretti (1994) .
15 . Thereason why migration occurs at discrete intervals oftime is that to migrate is generally
costly and the decision requires some time.
16 . As we argued (Chichilnisky and Di Matteo, 1992), in general we do not possess enough
empirical information to know whether when the terms of trade equal PB the equalized
real wage is negative: in this case a real wages gap could persist even aftermigration.
17. This outcome is in accord with a recent result (Chichilnisky and Di Matteo, 1992) where
in a model with labour and capital we showed that for some values ofthe terms oftrade it
is possible that as one factor moves the reward differential for the other factor widens . In
other words, we identified an interval for the terms oftrade with the property that when
equilibrium terms oftrade belong to that interval the movement ofone factor reduces its
own price differential but increases the price differential of the other factor.
18 . It has to be stressed that in (Di Matteo, 1993) Lerner's theorem does not hold. Also the
reaction ofthe other country after the introduction of the tariff is not considered as it calls
for different instruments ofanalysis .
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